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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 001346

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI - HEINTZELMAN  
DOD FOR OSD/CWMD - HERSMAN/SMITH  
DOD FOR OSD/APSA FOR  
GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/HAMM  
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5  
JOINT STAFF FOR J5  
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MNUC](#) [MARR](#) [CH](#) [RU](#) [JA](#) [KN](#)  
SUBJECT: U.S., JAPANESE OFFICIALS ENGAGE IN EXTENDED  
DETERRENCE DIALOGUE AND OVERVIEW OF 2009 NUCLEAR POSTURE  
REVIEW

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Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (b/d)

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SUMMARY  
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1. (S) A U.S. delegation, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Rebecca Hersman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer, and accompanied by VCI Senior Advisor Harry Heintzelman, engaged in a discussion on the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) with Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense officials on May 27 in Tokyo. Both sides exchanged briefings on the NPR process and Japanese views on U.S. strategic capabilities. Japanese officials underscored that close U.S.-Japan coordination is critical prior to any decisions by the U.S. Government to make substantial reductions in nuclear armaments as a result of negotiations with Russia. DASD Hersman pointed out that the actual number of nuclear warheads represents only one element in the overall review and that the deterrence capability of the U.S.-Japan alliance draws from a more comprehensive package of visible bilateral cooperation on multiple fronts. Both sides agreed that the lack of transparency regarding China's nuclear intentions is just as troubling as the build-up of its nuclear arsenal. Japanese officials noted that China appears to be increasingly bold in its actions in the region, including in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. They also urged the U.S. Government to inform Japan of any concerns raised by China on U.S.-Japan ballistic missile defense cooperation. End

Summary.

¶2. (S) On May 27, a U.S. delegation from DOD, State Department, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and Embassy Tokyo, led by DASD for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Rebecca Hersman and DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer, and accompanied by State Department Verification, Compliance and Implementation Senior Advisor Harry Heintzelman, met with Japanese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) for a bilateral dialogue on the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The senior Japanese representative was MOFA North American Affairs Bureau Deputy Director-General Koji Haneda. (Full participants list in para. 20.)

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U.S. 2009 NPR BRIEF  
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¶3. (S) DASD Hersman kicked off the meeting with a briefing on the 2009 NPR, noting that it is the third review of the U.S. nuclear posture conducted since the end of the Cold War. She emphasized that the review: 1) is a DOD-led, inter-agency process; 2) takes into account recommendations from the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission; and 3) is being conducted simultaneously with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Space Policy Review, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). She also outlined the NPR's objectives and explained that the review, among other things, will address the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies for the next five to ten years.

¶4. (S) DASD Hersman underscored that extended deterrence for  
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U.S. allies is central to the U.S. Government's planning and that the U.S. Government is unwavering in its commitment to the defense of its allies. The process involves more than simple, quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenal and is closely integrated with policy and posture reviews, including force structure choices and infrastructure assessments. It has four main working groups: policy and strategy, capability and force structure, stockpile and infrastructure, and international dimensions. DASD Hersman said the NPR will also inform negotiations with Russia on a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December, 2009,

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GOJ PRESENTATION ON U.S. STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES  
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¶5. (S) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Senior Coordinator Yusuke Arai presented Japanese perspectives on U.S. strategic capabilities, outlining key challenges from China, the DPRK, and Russia -- including political uncertainties in North Korea and China's asymmetrical warfare and area denial capabilities. Japan places considerable importance on the U.S. declaratory policy of commitment to nuclear deterrence, as well as maintaining sufficient capabilities to support it. Arai underscored that the foundation of Japan's national security rests on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, as well as Japanese participation in a number of multilateral nonproliferation regimes, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

¶6. (S) Arai highlighted the following as what the Japanese government considers "desired" characteristics of U.S. strike capabilities:

- flexible
- credible
- prompt
- discriminating and selective

- stealthy and also demonstrable
- sufficient to dissuade others

Arai noted that such strike capabilities, in addition to bilateral ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation, are critical for maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. Forward deployment of U.S. forces, development of Japan's plan on the use of space for national security, bilateral contingency planning, and intelligence sharing are also salient parts of the overall U.S.-Japan deterrence package.

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U.S.-JAPAN CONSULTATION CRITICAL PRIOR TO "DEEP CUTS"  
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¶17. (S) Arai underscored that the quantity and quality of the U.S. nuclear arsenal needs to have sufficient deterrent effect and changes to either should not provide potential adversaries incentive for expanding or modernizing their nuclear capabilities. He stressed that close consultations between the United States and Japan are essential prior to "deep cuts" in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. He also noted that Japan basically welcomes nuclear arms reduction by the United States and Russia, but the two governments need to be

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cognizant of China's expanding and modernizing nuclear capabilities. Finally, he urged the United States to be vigilant about BMD discussions between the United States and European countries because such discussions could have a negative impact on the U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation, as agreeing to BMD concessions in the START follow-on talks could provide China something to exploit, Arai suggested.

¶18. (S) Ministry of Defense (MOD) Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division Director Kiyoshi Serizawa echoed Arai's point that China, DPRK, and Russia presented the biggest security challenges for Japan, adding that China is clearly the primary concern. He asserted that the United States and Japan need to have a common view on China, especially regarding its intentions and capabilities. Although the U.S. position not to focus on the actual number of nuclear warheads is understandable, it does not change the fact that this number has a psychological effect with respect to deterrence, Serizawa argued. He added that the clear, consistent public message delivered by President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates that the United States remained committed to the defense of its allies was helpful in maintaining deterrence.

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WARHEAD NUMBERS MERELY ONE ELEMENT IN OVERALL REVIEW  
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¶19. (S) DASD Hersman pointed out that the United States agrees that the actual number of warheads is important, but the U.S. posture should not be defined by numbers only. The U.S. objective is to engage in a rich review that covers the full range of strategic, tactical, and policy issues. While the U.S. Government is cognizant of both the real and political sensitivities of numbers, the quantity of nuclear weapons is, ultimately, just one element of the overall review, Hersman said.

¶10. (S) DASD Schiffer agreed that the United States and Japan need to share their assessments of China, and queried the Japanese side on its assessment of China's capabilities, number of nuclear warheads, and rate of expansion. As the number of warheads has a political value in addition to being indicative of relative strength, it would be useful for both sides to discuss what either government would consider to be a "significant" number of Chinese warheads. Responding to MOFA North American Affairs DDG Haneda's query on U.S. attempts to engage in a strategic nuclear dialogue with China, Schiffer said China's overreaction to the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the recent incidents in the East China

Sea have prevented engagement at this point. As China recently indicated some willingness to re-engage in discussions, the U.S. Government will try again to schedule another session.

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CHINA'S INTENTION JUST AS TROUBLING AS CAPABILITIES  
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¶11. (S) MOFA's Arai stated that the lack of transparency in China's nuclear ambitions is equally as troubling as its development of capability. China, Arai noted, is the only country among the Party of Five (P-5) that is increasing both the quality and quantity of its nuclear arsenal. This is one of the fundamental reasons why public discussion on extended

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deterrence in Japan is picking up momentum. China's nuclear program, in combination with its recent anti-satellite test (ASAT), cyber attacks, and other belligerent actions, is troubling in the overall context. Moreover, Arai pointed out, China is clearly working toward improving its anti-access, area denial capabilities, including anti-submarine capabilities. If China perceives the United States having difficulty accessing the region, it is more likely to do "something stupid," Arai said.

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BOLDER ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY CHINA  
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¶12. (S) MOFA National Security Policy Division Director Makita Shimokawa pointed out that Chinese vessels have recently displayed an unusually bold attitude while intruding into Japanese territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands. In the past, the Chinese vessels would claim to have mistakenly entered Japanese waters, but were now claiming that they were patrolling Chinese territorial waters. This appeared to be related to China's recent "harassing actions" toward the United States, including the incidents in the South China Sea and the ASAT test, adding to anxieties about China's intentions, Shimokawa said. MOFA Policy Coordination Division Senior Coordinator Keiichi Ichikawa suggested the United States and Japan should pay attention to China's mid-range missiles, which could reach as far as India and Japan.

¶13. (S) MOD's Serizawa assessed that China is rapidly upgrading its nuclear capability beyond its relatively insignificant levels from the 1980s and the 1990s, and is trying to reach parity with Russia and the United States. It is also making significant progress on asymmetrical warfare, including cyber attacks. China is displaying newfound confidence in its military capabilities and is visibly showing its strength in the region, particularly with respect to the Senkakus. Serizawa said he believes China is making "step-by-step" overtures toward claiming the islands.

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PROVIDING POLITICAL AMMO TO ALLIANCE CRITICS  
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¶14. (S) Responding to USFJ BGen Toolan's question on Japanese "red lines" on U.S. force posture changes in the region in the context of deterrence, DDG Haneda said it is difficult to quantify acceptable limits. Qualitatively, however, close consultation and dialogue and air-tight coordination between the two governments are critical, Haneda stressed. The Perry-Schlesinger report provides useful guidance on the capabilities themselves, but it is more important to be mindful of unintentionally giving political ammunition to those questioning the strength of the Alliance's deterrence capability. Haneda cited as an example the perceived lack of bilateral coordination on the delisting of the DPRK from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.

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OVERALL STRENGTH OF ALLIANCE, SOLIDARITY AS DETERRENCE  
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¶15. (S) DASD Hersman pointed out that the overall strength of the Alliance, how the two governments portray it, and

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their mutual commitment to support each other from the most tactical level to the most strategic are the strongest indicators of the Alliance's deterrence capability. Host nation support is extremely important in that regard, as is every other open display of bilateral cooperation.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS  
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¶16. (S) On the issue of the relevance of extended deterrence to chemical-biological weapon attacks and the question of whether the United States can adequately protect Japan such attacks, DASD Hersman responded that the declarative policy is being considered across the board. In addition, chem/bio is one of the considerations among the Alternative Strategic Approaches being evaluated in the analytical process of the NPR. Regardless of the ability to deter such attacks, some strategic ambiguity may be beneficial. The NPR will review this topic and determine to what extent and what degree of flexibility is required, Hersman said. Responding to a comment regarding the Japanese public's concern about how the United States would respond to a DPRK chemical weapon attack on Japan, DASD Schiffer indicated that there should be no doubt that the United States would respond forcefully, but proportionally, and that such a response, therefore, could be conventional.

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BMD: JUST ROGUE STATES, OR RUSSIA AND CHINA TOO?  
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¶17. (S) In response to Serizawa's question on whether U.S. BMD policy envisions defense against attacks from rogue states only, or also anticipates attacks from Russia or China, DASD Schiffer said Secretary Gates had stated specifically in a recent interview that certain BMD systems need to be developed in the China context. DDG Haneda urged the United States to inform Japan of any concerns from China over U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation, as it is a priority issue for the Japanese government.

¶18. (S) In closing, DASD Hersman asked the group to consider how to continue the dialogue on NPR and think of next steps. MOFA provided the following contingency draft press guidance on whether the United States and Japan are engaged in a dialogue on extended deterrence:

BEGIN TEXT:

Japan and the United States have been discussing various matters relating to bilateral security and defense cooperation, including deterrence. Given the nature of the subject, we refrain from commenting on the substance of our discussion.

END TEXT

¶19. (U) DASD Hersman and DASD Schiffer have cleared this message.

¶20. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.:

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- Rebecca Hersman, DASD for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
- R. Michael Schiffer, DASD for East Asia
- BGen John Toolan, Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan
- Harry Heintzelman, Senior Advisor, VCI/SI, State
- Raymond Greene, Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Embassy Tokyo
- Jason Hamm, Country Director for Japan, OSD
- Lt Col Charles Smith, NPR Staff, OSD
- Dan Cintron, Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Tokyo
- Sangmin Lee, Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)

Japan:

- Koji Haneda, Deputy Director-General, North American Affairs, MOFA;
  - Makita Shimokawa, Director, National Security Policy Division, MOFA;
  - Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, MOD;
  - Yasunari Morino, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, MOFA;
  - Koichiro Nakajima, Director, Strategic Planning Office, MOD;
  - Yusuke Arai, Senior Coordinator, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, MOFA;
  - Keiichi Ichikawa, Senior Coordinator, Policy Coordination Division, MOFA;
  - Sugio Takahashi, Deputy Director, Strategic Planning Office, MOD;
  - Noriaki Abe, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, MOFA;
  - Hiroshi Sanomura, Official, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, MOFA
- ZUMWALT